Confederacy Theory

These analysts fear that mainland mainland chinas meliorate army equal to(p)ness risk undermining rate of flow shelter Hyannis predicated upon realisms hegemonic stably theory. Hegemonic stably argues that because the get together States possesses raise scotch and malpractice might, the transnational prescribe has remained coitionly inactive (Snyder 2009, 6-7). Liberalism and inter narrate cooperation has flourished because security has been guaranteed by the united States, who acts as an arbiter in local or functional disputes.Of late, however, US hegemony is waning. After two failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a global stinting recession, the relation baron losses of the united States coupled with the frugal and militaristic rise of mainland chincognizant has realist analysts hollering deepening security dilemmas between China and her neighbors and China and the US (Christensen 1999, 49-51 Braver 2007/8, 44 Newer 2009, 206-207).The security dilemma archives contends that declining US military unit and influence in East Asia entrust set up rise to forcefulnessiond nationalism, imbalance, and difference, and the emergence of a untested great reason capable of challenging the US will accelerate the decline of the us-backed liberalist invest (Snyder 1999, 10-12). Accordingly, a security dilemma follows logically with the decline of a hegemony. However, as China continues its ascent and the US seems poised to decline, the st zip of the global dictate has remained relatively in tact.In fact, rather than undermining or challenging the liberal international nightspot, China seems eager to accede in the existing structure (Liana 2007, 5-20). China is non adhering to Sun Tutus maxim that a rising power will increasingly flex its military muscle. Instead, Chinas behavior challenges existing arguments On power transitions, which assert that a rising state is credibly to use throw (Braver 2007, 47). Accordingly, the predominate Yosemite theories of realism and neo-liberals atomic follow 18 falling to adequately account for Chinas self-possessed and nonviolent behavior given Its gains In relative power (Newer 2009, 207).If a antithetical theory skunk more than accurately explain Chinas inactive rise despite relative power gains, than perhaps the very persuasion of a security dilemma can be effectively overejaculate. This sample will challenge hegemonic stably and Introduce the nascent concept of compact theory and Its gulden principle of a successfulness-interest. This essay will early(prenominal) only whent on that prosperity-interests be effectively maligning the conventional resent of a security dilemma in Taiwan and in China by elevating prosperity and a security dilemma are a self-fulfilling prophecy if you look for security concerns to be paramount, they will be.However, eon this narrative predicts increased tensions, the truth presents a far different picture. Security dilemmas are beingness normalized by an expanding commercialism that priorities pay offth and prosperity over appointment. coalition Theory Confederacy theory was presented by Squids Snyder who reflected that the actions of states in the current global order do not properly fit into extant general theories. Snyder argues that the liberal international order constructed post WI is no longer being singularly support by US hegemony.Instead, the international order is currently only iftressed by what Snyder calls a confederate structure composed of a cluster of liberal states engaged in vigorous commercial tintry (Snyder 2009, 15). The role of the linked States has shifted from being the systems underwriter to solely being its largest participant. At the center of the current international order are nations interacting and integrating commercially at unprecedented takes while simultaneously competing against one another to make gains in relative prosperity.The nucleus of this order is not composed of the United States, nor will it be controlled singularly by China or all rising state. Instead, power resides in a cohesive commercial league of nations centered around the strongest Western powers plus Japan. This league is a major power contour line that has altered competitive dynamics such that commercial integration non military opposition and revision, has become the dominant competitive strategy (Snyder 2009, 34).The Cold warfare marked an era wherein acquiring guns at any cost meant acquiring security and power hence why the Cold War is the holy person of realism. Today, however, the obvious reality that money buys guns is trumping the strategic imperative of having guns. In the current global order, wealth is power, and in order to maximize wealth, countries are seeking the longingd benefits derived from membership and inclusion in the commercial order (Snyder 2009, 19). The sheer magnitude of commercialism dictates that in order to compete nations essential(prenominal) Join in so as not to be odd behind.A countrys strength to a large degree hinges on its ability to blend itself into he dominant liberal commercial order, (Snyder 2009, 16). In order to prosper and be competitive, nations must appeal to abroad direct investment (FED), string the brightest minds from around the world, invest in human smashing, invest in orthogonal companies, attract overseas firms, reciprocally trade in raw tangibles, originate cheap muscularity, etc. (Myers 2010, 2-7). For a state to enhance its power and security, it must enhance its access to scotch and commercial resources.Failure to engage with this league of nations government agency a failure to economically grow and a failure to grow dads to instability, both domestically and militarily. Accordingly, the guiding principle to security and power isnt only if proclaiming a gun, its possessing the wealth and prosperity to buy a gun any time you need. Prosperity & The Security D ilemma What does this mean for Security dynamics? Despite underlying shifts in the distribution of power between nations, the radical represents the nucleus of a new order predicated upon prosperity, not military power.In this system, the nearly powerful driver of competitive behavior relates not to survival, but prosperity and medico (Snyder 2009, 16). To this point, confederacy theory seems in line with neo-liberalism. However, while integration can exist along a wide spectrum of interests, the principle phenomenon in confederacy theory focuses on the magnitude of commerce rather than on inter- governmental relations and the concept of institutional peace. Commercialism inherently requires a heavy degree of institutionalizing, but the important factor is that each state retains its sovereignty.A security dilemma is avoidable not because the institutions themselves mitigate conflict, but because commerce becomes the entrap arena wherein the balance has shifted from guns to butt er (Snyder 2009, While liberals optimistically hold back the end of competitive inclinations, confederacy theory argues that competitive dynamics persist, but only in reaction to economic pressures rather than conventional military capabilities. Every state still prefers to make gains relative to rivals in order to maintain a prosperity gap (Snyder 2009, 24).Accordingly, security interests are not abandoned for absolute gains only, prosperity interests have eclipsed security concerns while aspiration has shifted to immemorial rivalry (Snyder 2009, 34). Because competition and relative gains remain despite collaboration and overwhelming interaction, the security dilemma isnt simply removed from the equation. Instead, what confederacy theory argues is a normalization of traditional security concerns because a states viable strategic options are fundamentally limited.If participating in commercialism provides the means to economically prosper, indeed it logically follows that state s will conform to systemic requirements in order to be included. While institutions like the World Trade Organization exist to date fair trade raciest, what is more fascinating are how nations are conform their behavior to unwritten rules or best practices in order to increase national competitiveness economically. In order to attract capital and investment, nations must demonstrate political stability and economic liberalism.For instance, nations must have a consistent and enforceable legal system they must protect rational property, promote innovation, and enforce banking and finance norms. In short, capital follows opportunity and seeks knocked out(p) political stability (Snyder 2009, 20). Military posturing r even the threat of instability inherently limits national competitiveness in attracting capital and reaping. Chinas GAP the twelvemonth before the Attainment square incident grew 1 1. 9% in the two years following Attainment, GAP grew merely 4. 1% and 3. 8% respective ly (Workloads).Security dilemmas will still exist, but countries literally can not afford to act upon fears at the risk of substantially limiting their ability to continue to prosper relative to other nations. Even those who might arguably have Justifiable reason to fear one another?as the US might be wary of Chinas rise?none can actually afford to act on Hess fears in the ways unrealism expects (Snyder 2009, 19). Concerning the security dilemmas that may arise from Chinas military modernization, none is more risky than the China-Taiwan relationship.China has continued to emphasize its virtuoso-China policy as a top priority, and to demonstrate their resolve, China has hundreds of missiles pointed at Taipei to ensure compliance to the 2005 anti-cessation law imperil force if Taiwan proceeds with formal independence (Rigger 2006, 1). Realist analysts view the region as a powder keg waiting to erupt. To highlight the astuteness of concern, realists note that even characteristics of the traditional security dilemma are heightened as defensive weaponry, which is usually not considered a move towards escalation, is seen as overtly threatening (Christensen 2009, 51).Despite these ominous trends, Taiwan is actually moving well-nighr to China rather than distancing itself (Rigger 2006, 2-4). Though Taiwan is experiencing increased nationalism, which should fuel resentment and conflict, traditional realist concerns over military balancing are not their immediate concern. on that point is an emerging paradox in Taiwan wherein as the number of passel identifying themselves as Taiwanese increases, on that point is a simultaneous decreasing desire for formal independence.Shelley Rigger investigated this phenomenon and reason that a generational gap exists in Taiwan wherein the younger population (18-35), though increasingly identifying themselves as Taiwanese, looks upon China with pragmatism and rationality rather than traditional enmity. Rigger does note that, in that respect is powerful logic That as Taiwanese lose their emotional adhesion to Chinese identity, they will be slight interested in interacting with China. such a powerful logic, however, is rooted in an obsolete model of systemic theory.Instead, Rigger notes that the emotional component that normally triggers resentment and distrust in these instances is being replaced with increased pragmatism. In a survey Rigger conducted of 18-35 year old Taiwanese residents, 73% of respondents said they would set ahead increasing cross-strait economic engagement (Rigger 2006, 29) as a means to improving Titans economy. Additionally, a bulk of respondents said theyd be willing to work or study in mainland China.In a subsequent survey asking what is their close pressing concern, mass of 19-30 year old Taiwanese residents cited personal economic concerns as the number one issue only 7% of respondents cited political tensions with China. Rigger concluded that for the younger generation of Taiwanese issues of unification and independence are of pocketable concern to them They are far more interested in practical issues involving economics, employment, and education (Rigger 2006, 27). Accordingly, the trend of Atomization that realists fear has instead produced immense optimism about the hereafter of China-Taiwan relations (Rigger 2006, 4).As the elder generation of Taiwan residents slowly cedes power to a younger and less(prenominal) historically minded generation of politicians, businessmen, and military officers, there is a greater likelihood that hostilities will be minimized by a rationality and pragmatism that recognizes cooperation and commercialism as the means to economic prosperity. China & The Security Dilemma been the principal drivers of Chinas very high level of international economic integration. In turn, the pragmatic imperative to continue quick economic growth As gradually led China to participate more actively and cooperatively (Lang 007, 147) . This pragmatic imperative explains why, in the military realm, China has been less belligerent than leading theories of IR might have predicted (Braver, 2007/8, 45). Taylor Braver examined all instances, since 1949, in which China use force during territorial disputes. He concluded that China rarely exploits its military superiority and has instead opted to offer concessions rather than leverage or utilize military force (Braver 2007/8, 45).In the instances where force was use, China had suffered a negative shift in bargaining power, meaning Chinas relative power was lessened by he the military modernization of a rival (Braver 2007/8, 47). Framers polishs directly challenge realist claims. China has only used forced when its relative power has declined and not when its power has increased This study reinforces the notion that though security dilemmas may still exist, China will not be the instigator of tensions.The United States or Taiwan may view Chinas actions as heightening or elevating security concerns, but in reality, China acts simply to maintain a security balance rather than to increase their own branch-strike capability. While examining the role of the propose in crafting Chinas policy toward Taiwan, Ellis java notes that while the PLAN is largely responsible for coercing and deterring Taiwan from independence, the Plans aggressive statements and military exercises are mostly for show rather than a precursor to action Coffee 1997, 64-68).Coffee points out that there is no concrete evidence that PLAN leaders have pushed for military action against Taiwan, and that logic does not point to this conclusion Foe 1997, 68). The Plans military posturing may benefit its budget and influence, but any military action aeries the danger of escalation Its costs are likely to be enormous. Accordingly, the PLAN flirts with threatening statements, but it is not courting the thinker of actual military aggression. The central problem in trying to take in The P arty security thinking lies in an inability to see how the PLAN would be able to harness even its most impressive new capabilities to prevail at an acceptable cost in a conflict (Newer 2009, 206). The higher the costs for a host nation in initiating conflict, the less likely offensive action will be pursued (Braver 2007/8, 78) as a result, without including imperialism and its role in providing growth and prosperity, the existing realist equation used to predict conflict is short inadequate.Both statements and military modernization efforts are being interpreted using traditional realism (Newer 2009, 206-207) however, the reality screams of a different truth. Today, the economic costs of aggression are mitigating security concerns China wise to(p) this truth briefly after Attainment Square, and they have been wary of aggression ever since. China Prosperity as a Strategic domineering The secret to Chinas meteoric rise, according to William Overshot, has been emulating global b est practices in economic development (Overshot 2012, 134).Chinas economy has grown 14 fold over the past 30 years sustaining a roughly 10% annual growth in GAP. Such immense prosperity is directly attributable to a strategy China is both the most pure form of prosperity-interest, and the first to openly acknowledge that the military prerogative takes a backseat to domestic prosperity. One of the most pressing domestic security and economic concerns for the ICP is sustaining adequate melodic phrase growth for tens of one thousand thousands of migrants, new entrants to the ark force, and workers laid off from state-owned enterprises not worth deliver (Myers 2010, 4).Accordingly, China launched, in 2000, a Go Global strategy which sought to encourage Chinese firms to invest overseas, and to attract overseas investments into the mainland. The Go Global strategy makes China better able to seek more profitable ways of investing its massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, to gain access to foreign technology and management skills to help domestic firms become more efficient and internationally competitive, and most importantly, to acquire energy and raw materials (Myers 2010, 4-5).By the closelipped of 2004, over 80% of the worlds top 500 companies have invested in China (Snyder 2009, 23). In 1975 Chinas net trade revenues were $15 billion by the close of 2006, trade totals eclipsed $1. 5 trillion (Snyder, 2009, 23) an increase of roughly FED 1983 be a mere $636 million in 2008, FED totaled $92 billion (Myers 2010, 4). Additionally, the Chinese government estimates that there are currently 286,200 foreign companies currently operating in China employing more than 42 million Chinese citizens (Myers 2010, 4).These figures illustrate that Chinas rise has been dependent on attracting foreign capital and external resources. Newer argues that more than simply an economic need, Chinas mass importation of materials and energy is part of a systematic strategy to force resource fecund neighboring nations to rely on China for their own prosperity (Newer 2009, 208-209). This reliance, argues Newer, forms a dependency in which China guarantees regional stability and nonviolence by ensuring that no neighboring nation would attack China because that nations economy is utterly dependent upon Chinas import and consumer power (Newer 009, 208).What Newer fails to appreciate or note, however, is that China has come to equally depend on these neighboring nations much in the homogeneous way. Dependency theory is often presented negatively in IR (often used to explain how the strong North exploits and suppresses the weak South), but it is not necessarily a bad thing. Dependency implies an overlap of shared interest. China has negotiated a $41 billion with Australia for its liquefied natural gas and they have agreed withal $5. 6 billion deal with Manner, a Chinese border-nation, to export energy from Manners leading energy consortium (Myers 2010, 5 ).The fundamental shift in power transition theory demands why, in todays world, would any country stab a trading partner in the back after formalizing massively sound commercial exchanges? Conclusion Somali pirates have resurged lately disrupting the flow of vegetable oil from the Middle East. Because great power prosperity is heavily reliant on this flow of oil, the Gulf is now being protected by Chinese, European, and American warships all coexisting in this small waterway to protect material resources that quite literally fuel each nations economic growth.Traditional realism should predict conflict in the gulf considering oil is currently one of the most coveted natural resources. However, rather than nation is happy to avoid conflict so long as oil flows unobstructed. Commercialism if effectively minimizing traditional security concerns. What will ultimately determine Chinas rise is not a security dilemma, but whether its domestic reforms can keep pace with economic realities that dictate national growth or stagnation. China has become aware of such a reality and has opted to pursue prosperity.